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THREE QUESTIONS ABOUT “INFORMAL REGULATION”
Christian J. Tams*
In the grand debates of international law, the jus ad bellum is often proclaimed dead, and just as often praised as
the “cornerstone” of the contemporary legal order. Both perspectives tend to ignore that the jus ad bellum is not
static, but a body of law that states adjust over time. In an important contribution, Monica Hakimi proposes to
look at one particular aspect of such adjustment, a concept she frames as “informal regulation” through Security
Council action. This essay engages with Hakimi’s approach. It inquires whether this approach is as “informal” as
Hakimi suggests, and asks whether “informal regulation”—rather than constituting a new category of state activ-
ities to study—is not already part of conventional approaches to the jus ad bellum. Proceeding from Hakimi’s anal-
ysis, the comment assesses whether there is room for “informal regulation” beyond the Security Council.
Three Questions
I share Monica Hakimi’s interest in the manner in which international law regulates recourse to military force
(what she terms the “regulatory form”).1 Like her, I believe we need to engage with regulatory challenges and
changing approaches to the jus ad bellum.2 And like Hakimi, I believe that states and scholars would beneﬁt
from reﬂecting more on this question, moving beyond simply rehearsing arguments about the legality of particular
uses of force.
While sharing her starting points and interest, I am less sure that Hakimi’s new category of “informal regula-
tion”—understood as “processes at the [Security] Council for approving speciﬁc operations” involving the use of
force that stop short of formal authorization—offers the best way forward. To stimulate further conversation
about the subject, and because my own reﬂection on it is still ongoing, I have chosen to structure my comments
in the form of questions to help frame the continued debate.
– First, what is the relationship between the informal regulation and the “general standards” governing
recourse to force, on which Hakimi believes “conventional accounts” remain focused?
– Second, do we really need a new category to be able to deal with the types of activities captured by “infor-
mal regulation”?
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– And third, if we look beyond the “general standards,” should we not also look to “informal regulation”
that takes place outside the Security Council?
Who’s Afraid of General Standards?
Hakimi’s key goal, as I read it, is to broaden the framework of our debates about the jus ad bellum—so that one
important piece of evidence, informal regulation at the Security Council, can better be integrated into the analysis.
This evidence, Hakimi argues, “is both part of the jus ad bellum and different in kind from regulation through the
general standards.”3 I discuss below whether informal regulation is not already “part of the jus ad bellum” (even in
what Hakimi refers to as “conventional accounts”). For the purpose of this ﬁrst question, however, I am interested
in exploring whether it is really “different in kind from regulation through the general standards.”On the basis of
Hakimi’s account, I struggle to see that it is.
Hakimi’s approach is informed by a distinction between two forms of regulation: (i) general standards; and (ii)
particularistic processes.4 The former seeks to regulate recourse to force through a “small set of generally appli-
cable substantive standards.”5 The latter (the “particularistic processes”) do not seem to apply generally, but are
addressed to “the speciﬁc circumstances of the case.”6 Importantly, these particularistic processes are meant to
operate independently of the general standards and, if we follow Hakimi, the fact that they are more independent
makes them appealing. She notes, “[T]he best way to strengthen the jus ad bellum… is probably to rely less on the
general standards and more on the informal regulation.”7
The underlying viewof the jus ad bellum’s regulatory form leavesme puzzled. I agree that exceptions to the ban on
force come in different forms: some set out objective criteria (such as the presence of an “armed attack,” however
deﬁned), while others rely on the decision of a particular organ (such as the Security Council). The former, in
Hakimi’s terms, would be more “substantive” in character, the latter more “procedural.” But contrary to what
Hakimi suggests, substance and procedure do not translate into “general” versus “particular”: in both instances,
the lawfulness of a particular use of force depends on whether the state using force can point to a recognized
general standard whose conditions are met in a given case. The “two forms of regulation” operate hand in hand.
Hakimi seems to accept as much when recognizing that the general standards relied upon in the conventional
account “ha[ve] a procedural component,”8 and indeed, given the almost exclusive reliance, in Article 42 of the
UN Charter, on a particular decision-making procedure (the passing of a resolution by the Council), it would be
difﬁcult to think otherwise. She considers this to be unproblematic for her argument, though, as under the con-
ventional account, “for a process to be legally relevant, it must breathe life into a general standard.”9
But would the “informal regulation” that she advocates really be different? Can the particularistic processes
of “informal regulation” that Hakimi wants us to engage with really operate independently of the general stan-
dards? I struggle to see how. If Hakimi claims that certain forms of Security Council action (her “informal reg-
ulation”) should affect judgments about the legality of a particular use of force, then she—just like the
“conventional account” she is so critical of—proceeds from a general standard. She chooses not to spell it out,
but it is implicit in her claim. Let me illustrate this by reference to one of her examples, namely her consideration
3 Hakimi, supra note 1, at 156.
4 Id. at 158.
5 Id. at 152.
6 Id. at 168.
7 Id. at 182.
8 Id. at 159.
9 Id.
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that in individual instances support at the Council can “counterbalanc[e] the perceptions of illegality that come
with deviating from the general standards” regulating recourse to force.10 By asking the question (even if one
leaves open the answer, as Hakimi does), it seems to me one has to accept a certain general standard—which,
on the basis of Hakimi’s argument, I would formulate as follows: “In exceptional cases, a use of force that prima facie
violates Article 2(4) is not unlawful if it has the clear support of a majority of Security Council members.” (Hakimi might not agree
with the formulation; she is keen to keep the possibility of lawfulness via majoritarian support in the Council nar-
row. But she considers it at least arguable that conduct short of a resolution can affect the lawfulness of a use of
force.)
The standard just formulated is different from the conventional one advocated by many other commentators,
according to whom only a Security Council resolution can render forcible measures lawful. But it is no less general:
in both instances, the lawfulness of a particular use of force depends on the assessment of the Council and its
members in a particular circumstance. What separates Hakimi’s account from the conventional one is the content
of the standard, not its generality. In both instances, “for a process to be relevant, it must breathe life into [some]
general standar[d].”11 I do not see how any particularistic process could operate “independently of the general
standards.” Hakimi’s does not; she just does not spell it out. The question is whether the general standard she
implies is acceptable.
Do Prior Accounts of the Jus ad Bellum Ignore “Informal Regulation”?
My second question engages with Hakimi’s central argument: her claim that prior accounts of the jus ad bellum
ignore informal regulation, or are “inadequate to describe or explain the law’s operation” in cases of Security
Council action below the level of an authorizing resolution.12
On the basis of her discussion, I believe that this claim is only partially justiﬁed. More speciﬁcally, it seems to me
that in the scenarios discussed in Section IV of Hakimi’s article, many commentators (including those offering
what Hakimi refers to as “conventional accounts”) accept that informal regulation matters. In my reading, the
difference between Hakimi’s approach andmany of the conventional accounts relates to the manner in which infor-
mal regulation is integrated into the analysis—the “how,” not the “if.”
Let me try to illustrate this by reference to Hakimi’s ﬁrst example of how informal regulation works in practice,
namely the Council’s determination of a factual predicate. Under that rubric, Hakimi discusses the recent inter-
ventions in Mali and Yemen and assesses the relevance of Security Council decisions identifying the rightful leader
of a country. She views these decisions as highly signiﬁcant, as they clariﬁed that states that had been invited to
intervene by the rightful leader had acted lawfully: “By establishing the factual predicates for the standard’s appli-
cation, the Council contributed to, and did not merely sign off on, the intervention’s lawfulness.”13
I entirely agree. But do we need a new category of “informal regulation” to explain this? Could this not be a
regular case of intervention by invitation under the accepted general standards? It seems tome perfectly possible to
say that in the cases ofMali and Yemen, the Security Council’s conduct was a signiﬁcant factor in assessing whether
a particular leader could invite a foreign state to intervene: for consent to remove the wrongfulness of an inter-
vention, it has to be validly given, after all, so why should the Security Council’s assessment not be relevant in this
respect? Conversely, neither Hakimi nor the “conventionalists”would need to treat it as determinative. (According
to Hakimi, the Council merely helped make the interventions lawful. This to me seems relatively close to Karine
10 Id. at 166.
11 Id. at 159.
12 Id. at 174.
13 Id. at 175.
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Bannelier and Théodore Christakis’s view—which Hakimi cites as “conventional”—according to whom “the
Council accepted the validity of the legal basis of intervention by invitation.”14)
Whereas Hakimi sees “analytic pitfalls of the conventional account” and ﬁnds the consent standard “ill-deﬁned
for such cases,”15 I see a large measure of agreement between her approach and the conventional account. This
agreement covers three central propositions: (i) the interventions in Mali and Yemen needed to be justiﬁed in
order to be lawful; (ii) in assessing whether they were lawful, the views of the Security Council mattered, but
were not conclusive; and (iii) those views were relevant even though the Security Council did not authorize force
under Chapter VII of the Charter, but opted for what Hakimi terms “informal regulation.” Returning to the theme
ofmy earlier remarks, it seems tome that bothHakimi andmany “conventionalists” operate on the basis of the same
general standard, which I would formulate as follows: “A state does not violate Article 2(4) if it intervenes in another state with
the valid consent of that other state. In situations of civil strife, the views of the international community are important in assessing which of
different rival factions can validly consent; this is especially true if those views are recorded in resolutions of the Security Council.”
Given this agreement, the real question to me seems to be how to integrate the Security Council’s determination
within the analysis. I view Hakimi’s decision to place it in a new category called “informal regulation” to be a ﬁne-
tuning of, rather than a radical break with, conventional accounts. Whether the new category is necessary, I am not
entirely sure. Are the rules on how to interpret treaties and ascertain custom not ﬂexible enough to accommodate
what Hakimi wants us to include in the analysis? The International Law Commission, for one, in its recent projects
on the identiﬁcation of custom16 and the role of subsequent practice,17 recognizes the relevance of resolutions of
international organizations and of state conduct preceding their adoption.
Informal Regulation Outside the Security Council
Whether necessary or not, Hakimi’s suggestion to take informal regulation seriously no doubt offers a fresh
perspective. But how far does it go—and how far is she willing to extend it? Hakimi remains focused on a par-
ticular type of evidence, namely conduct by the Security Council, or that of Security Council members if their
conduct evidences “majoritarian support” for a particular operation. The latter category, she suggests, deﬁnes
the “outer bounds of the jus ad bellum’s informal regulation.”18 But should we not look further?
It seems to me that if informal regulation offers a promising alternative to the recognized general standards,
then we should not stop at the Security Council, but also should ask questions about other processes and other
actors. Of course, the Security Council bears primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
14 See Karine Bannelier & Theodore Christakis, Under the UN Security Council’s Watchful Eyes: Military Intervention by Invitation in the Malian
Conﬂict, 26 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 855, 873 (2013).
15 Hakimi, supra note 1, at 173–74.
16 See, e.g., Int’l LawComm’n, Draft Conclusions on the Identiﬁcation of Customary International Law, UNDoc. A/71/10 (2016), Draft
Conclusion 12 (“A resolution adopted by an international organization or at an intergovernmental conference may provide evidence for
establishing the existence and content of a rule of customary international law, or contribute to its development.”). According to Draft
Conclusion 6(2), state practice includes “conduct in connection with resolutions adopted by an international organization or at an inter-
governmental conference.” Id. at 77–78.
17 Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Conclusions on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to the Interpretation of
Treaties, UN Doc. A/71/10, at 123 (2016), Draft Conclusion 12 (“2. Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under article 31,
paragraph 3, or other subsequent practice under article 32, may arise from, or be expressed in, the practice of an international organization in
the application of its constituent instrument. 3. Practice of an international organization in the application of its constituent instrument may
contribute to the interpretation of that instrument when applying articles 31, paragraph 1, and 32.”).
18 Hakimi, supra note 1, at 180.
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security; this makes it special. However, its responsibility is not exclusive, and the “competing demands for dis-
patch, ﬂexibility, and collective legitimization” are also assessed in other fora and through other processes. Hakimi
mentions one such other process when referencing the debate about the General Assembly’s competence to
authorize forcible interventions under the Uniting for Peace doctrine.19 But there are so many more, including
the following:
– What about decentralized reactions outside the Security Council through which states seem to accept or
condone particular uses of force? Would this not also be a process of informal regulation—and would
reactions outside the Council not offer a richer body of evidence and pose more challenging questions?
– What about regional institutions asserting a right to use force against a member state in cases that do not
necessarily square with the jus ad bellum as conventionally understood? Article 4(h) of the African Union
Constitutive Act recognizes “[t]he right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a deci-
sion of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against
humanity.” Would this be a form of informal regulation, at least if viewed from the perspective of the
universal system of collective security established by the UN Charter?
– What about decisions by the General Assembly that establish the factual predicates or even the scope of
application of a general jus ad bellum standard—say, that force must not be used in violation of “inter-
national lines of demarcation, such as armistice lines, established by or pursuant to an international
agreement?”20 Is this perhaps also an informal regulation of the jus ad bellum?
– Finally, what about decisions of other international groupings that endorse particular uses of force—
such as, for instance, frequent afﬁrmations by the Non-Aligned Movement of the legitimacy of armed
struggle in wars of national liberation?21 While the issues may have lost political signiﬁcance in a post-
decolonization era, perhaps they appear in hindsight as an example of informally adapting the jus ad
bellum?
These instances of informal regulation did or do not involve the Security Council, which is the organ primarily
responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Perhaps this means that we should view these
attempts at informal regulation of the jus ad bellum with greater caution. But that question goes to the value of the
evidence; it does not suggest that we should ignore the evidence altogether.
Conclusion
In the spirit of Hakimi’s exploration, it seems to me that, when engaging with informal regulation, we ought to
open up the inquiry and look to processes not involving the Council. To do so will allow us to appreciate how
much, since 1945, the content of the jus ad bellum has been molded and forged in international practice, with occa-
sional input from the Security Council. The debate about informal regulation by and at the Council could beneﬁt
from engaging more fully with other processes of adapting the jus ad bellum, which could yield lessons about when
attempts to shape the jus ad bellum are effective, and when they are not. Finally, a broader inquiry will help clarify
that what Hakimi calls “informal regulation” has never been absent from debates about the jus ad bellum. This
suggests that, in her quest for nuance, Hakimi is right to look beyond the express Charter rules.
19 Id. at 165, n.73.
20 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970) (Principle I, Paragraph 5).
21 See, e.g., the views set out in the Second Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, repro-
duced in UN Doc. A/5763 (Oct. 29, 1964).
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